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COMPULSORY OIL AND GAS UNITIZATION: 
EFFECT ON OVERRIDING ROYALTY OBLIGATIONS 
A HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT OF JURISTIC REVIEW 
IN 
PETER Fox BREWING Co. v. SoHIO PETROLEUM Co.• 
Maurice H. Merrillt 
Jus, CHIEF JUSTICE. As should be well known, our practice is to sit in review of decisions presenting elements of difficulty, and 
concerning the propriety of which there seems reason for doubt. 
We have no jurisdiction to reverse, to modify, or to affirm. Our 
judgment must be confined to approval or to disapprobation, or to 
some position between these two extremes. 
The principal case, as determined in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois1 and as affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,2 appears to be a matter 
peculiarly apt for our examination. It is not alone that the decision 
is on important questions of law which were hotly contested and 
closely debated. There is the further consideration that the points 
determined were of first impression, involving construction of the 
statutory law of a distant jurisdiction and application of that law 
in a context not familiar to those sitting in judgment. If these 
points were determined improperly, the effect of the precedent, if 
we allow it to go unexamined, may be most unfortunate. Of course, 
even should we come to the conclusion that the disposition was 
wrong, this misfortune may not be avoided. Courts with more 
mundane competence than ours may accept the authority of the 
decisions. But, at least, we shall have made available our views. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
In some respects, our statement of facts will be more in detail 
than that contained in the opinions filed by the courts under re-
view. However, it does not alter the essential bases of the litigation. 
The additional detail serves merely to clarify the legal issues 
involved. 
Fox and Schmitz, hereinafter designated for convenience as 
• 296 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1961), affirming 189 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ill. 1960). 
t Research Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.-Ed. 
l Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. III. 1960). 
2 296 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1961). 
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F, owned certain oil leases on land in Oklahoma.8 By contract, 
hereinafter referred to as the Agreement, executed August 20, 
1943, F contracted with the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, here-
inafter referred to as S,4 to assign these leases to S in return for a 
cash consideration and other stipulations which, so far they are 
important, are specified hereinafter. By the terms of the Agree-
ment and of the effectuating assignments, F reserved, as to all the 
leases "as a group," 
" ... an overriding royalty (free and clear of all development 
and operating expense) . . . of one-half of the crude oil, gas, 
casinghead gas, and other hydro-carbons produced, saved and 
marketed from said leasehold premises or the proceeds thereof 
accruing to the working interests assigned and transferred 
hereunder to Standard or its nominee, subject, however, to a 
deduction from said one-half (½) of the following items: 
". . . (b) That quantity of crude oil, gas, casinghead gas, 
and other hydro-carbons, or the proceeds thereof, which at 
current well market prices at the time of sale thereof, shall be 
equal in value to $200 per each producing well per month, 
except that in the event that any well producing oil in paying 
quantities shall at the same time produce water in excess of 
10% of the total fluid produced from the well, then as to that 
well during such period while such condition shall exist the 
deduction shall be that quantity of crude oil, gas, casinghead 
gas, and other hydro-carbons, or the proceeds thereof which at 
current well market prices at the time of sale thereof shall be 
equal in value to $250 per month." 
If this subtraction, and other authorized deductions which now 
have become obsolete, produced a deficit for any month, F was to 
be under no duty to make up the deficit, but such deficits were to 
be carried forward and deducted from net amounts due F in the 
future "until such deficit or deficits shall have been liquidated." 
Obviously, under such an arrangement, some wells might decline 
in production to a point indicating permanent unprofitability to 
F. As a safeguard against such an outcome, F was permitted to 
3 While we speak of Fox and Schmitz only in the role of plaintiffs, actually, as the 
result of various transfers of interest, many persons came to occupy the position of plain-
tiffs and some were divested of their interests during the progress of the litigation. Our 
concentration upon the individuals Fox and Schmitz is in the interest of simplicity. 
4 Actually, Standard later transferred its interests to its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Sohio Oil Company. In the interest of simplicity, we shall ignore this transfer, which in 
no way altered the legal picture, and shall continue to use the letter S to designate 
Standard or Sohio, whichever at the moment was the owner of the leases. 
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tender to S an assignment of "all right, title or interest in and to 
the overriding royalty reserved herein in so far as the same related 
or pertains to" any well as to which the amounts payable did not 
exceed the amounts deductible for ninety days or more. There-
after, computations of overriding royalties were to be made with-
out reference to the production from wells so released. 
S, in turn, assumed obligations to F. It agreed to shut in no 
paying well except for necessary repair or reconditioning work or 
for compliance with state or federal regulation.I' It agreed to de-
velop and operate the properties "in a good and workmanlike 
manner at all times,"6 and agreed that producing wells should be 
kept "at the maximum rate of production" allowed by the state 
or federal authority having jurisdiction.7 It agreed to render to F 
monthly itemized statements of receipts and disbursements, to give 
F "pertinent information" concerning drilling and operations, and 
to permit F to examine relevant books and records.8 S, while re-
taining full discretion as to the development and operation of the 
premises, agreed to manage and develop the entire premises "to 
the mutual benefit of both parties and in compliance at all times 
with the 'prudent operator' rule."9 In case of failure to offset wells 
on adjoining land, S agreed that there should be reassigned to F, 
on demand, forty acres centered about the site where the offset 
should have been drilled.10 S was to give F thirty days notification 
of the intended abandonment of any well, whereupon F was to 
have the option, within twenty days, to request a reassignment of 
the forty acres surrounding that well upon paying S the fair value 
of the equipment connected with the well. Upon such reassign-
ment the well, its production, and the reassigned area were to be 
excluded from the provisions_ of the agreement.11 
This contract became effective. The assignments were made. 
S took over the development and operation of the assigned leases. 
Thereafter, at its 1945 session, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a 
statute authorizing the compulsory merging of oil and gas proper-
ties tapping a common source of supply for the purpose of unitized 
operation.12 Under this statute, the West Edmond Hunton Lime 
IS Agreement § 5. 
a Id. § 6. 
7 Id.§ 5. 
s Id.§ 6. 
9 Id.§ 8. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Id. § I!I. 
12 Okla. Sess. Laws 1945, tit. 52, ch. 3b. 
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Unit was created, effective October 1, 1947. It embraced, along 
with other properties, all the leases then covered by the Agreement. 
The production from these leases was from the Hunton Lime. S 
became the Unit Operator, under the supervision of the Operating 
Committee of the Unit. In 1951 the original unitization statute was 
repealed.13 However, it was replaced by a substitute law14 which, 
insofar as the matters involved in this litigation are concerned, was 
practically identical with the prior law. For that reason, reference 
will be made to the present statute, under which the Unit now is 
operating.15 The details of the operation of these laws, as they af-
fect the problem at hand, will be developed more fully in the 
appropriate portions of this opinion. 
In the due course of the unitized operation, a number of the 
wells subject to the Agreement were abandoned as producing wells. 
The tracts on which these abandoned wells were located continued 
to share in the unit production according to the percentage assigned 
to them in connection with the unitization. Despite the discontin-
uance of these wells, S persisted in subtracting from the share of 
the return apportioned to each such tract the monthly decrement 
provided for in the Agreement.16 Likewise, it made that same 
deduction for the wells continued in operation. This was done in 
reliance upon those provisions of the unitization statute reading: 
"Property rights, leases, contracts, and all other rights and 
obligations shall be regarded as amended and modified to the 
extent necessary to conform to the provisions and require-
ments of this Act and to any valid and applicable plan of 
unitization or order of the Commission made and adopted 
pursuant hereto, but otherwise to remain in full force and 
effect . ... The amount of the unit production allocated to each 
separately-owned tract within the unit, and only that amount, 
regardless of the well or wells in the unit area from which it 
may be produced, and regardless of whether it be more or less 
than the amount of the production from the well or wells, 
if any, on any such separately-owned tract, shall for all intents, 
uses and purposes be regarded and considered as production 
from such separately-owned tract, and, except as may be other-
1a Okla. Sess. Laws 1951, tit. 52, ch. 3b, § 16. 
14 Now OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 287.1-.15 (1961). 
15 Cf. Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 343 U.S. 390 (1952), upholding 
the unitization legislation in litigation commenced before the repeal and substituted 
enactment, the Supreme Court of the United States having been "advised by the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma that this repeal had no effect on these causes." 
16 Agreement § 4. 
1964] COMPULSORY UNITIZATION 385 
wise authorized in this Act, or in the plan of unitization ap-
proved by the Commission, shall be distributed among or the 
proceeds thereof paid to the several persons entitled to share 
in the production from such separately-owned tract in the 
same manner, in the same proportions, and upon the same 
conditions that they would have participated and shared in the 
production or proceeds thereof from such separately owned 
tract had not said unit been organized and with the same legal 
force and effect."11 
The deductions taken by S have produced a deficit, as to many 
of the tracts, in the share accruing to the overriding royalty. Fur-
ther, the allocable proportion under the unitized operation has 
resulted in less monthly revenue to the tracts under the Agreement 
than was realized under individual operation. 
In consequence, plaintiffs below, some original owners of and 
some successors to the F interests, filed this suit against S to reform 
the agreement by eliminating the provision for the per well deduc-
tion, as being in conflict with the Oklahoma unitization law and 
the actual unitization agreement, and as being frustrated in its 
contractual object by the operation of the unitization agreement. 
Plaintiffs asked an accounting covering the sums which would have 
been due to the F interests under the contract as reformed from 
the date of unitization. At law they sought a money judgment on 
the theory that, as the enactment of the unitization statute and the 
creation of the unit ipso facto invalidated the provision for the per-
well deduction, no reformation was actually necessary; in any event, 
they contended, elimination of the deductions as to the abandoned 
wells did not require reformation. The trial court denied all relief, 
and the court of appeals affirmed this denial in all respects. 
In reviewing these determinations, we shall enumerate, first, 
certain general elementary principles which seem to us basic for 
the proper solution of the problems presented by the litigation. 
Then we shall discuss, in greater detail, the specific issues requiring 
answer in order to provide the correct determination of these prob-
lems. 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
A. The Agreement, relating to an interest in Oklahoma land18 
and necessitating performance in Oklahoma, is governed by Okla-
11 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). (Emphasis added.) 
18 Black v. Wickett, 146 Okla. 191, 293 Pac. 782 (1930). 
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homa law as to validity,19 and as to obligations of performance.20 
B. By the Oklahoma statutes, performance of the Agreement 
has become illegal to such extent as may be necessary to conform to 
the unitization law and to the Plan of Unitization of the West Ed-
mond Hunton Lime Unit adopted in pursuance thereof. The 
Agreement and the rights and obligations thereunder must be 
regarded as amended and modified to that extent.21 
C. By the Oklahoma statutes: "A contract must be so inter-
preted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties, as 
it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertain-
able and lawful."22 "The whole of a contract is to be taken together, 
so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each 
clause helping to interpret the others.''23 "A contract must receive 
such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, 
reasonable and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done 
without violating the intention of the parties."24 "However broad 
may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things con-
cerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract."25 
D. By the law of Oklahoma, "A contract may be explained by 
reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the 
matter to which it relates."26 Hence testimony may be received to 
establish these matters.27 
E. Under these principles, it is clear that, in determining the 
extent to which the Agreement is not in harmony with the provi-
sions and requirements of the unitization law, a particular provi-
sion may not be read in isolation. A portion of the Agreement may 
not be sustained simply because there is no verbal inconsistency 
between it and the statute. It must be read in connection with 
related clauses, to determine the general intent of the parties, in 
the light of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
contract, as shown by the evidence and by circumstances of which 
the court may take judicial notice; that general intent must be 
19 R.EsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § ll60(1) (19ll4). 
20 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 162 (1961); 2 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws § ll46.6 (1935); Goon• 
RICH, CONFLICT OF LAws ll40 (3d ed. 1949); R.EsrATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 19, § ll58. 
21 OKLA. STAT, tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). 
22 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 152 (1961). 
23 OKLA. STAT, tit. 15, § 157 (1961). 
24 OKLA, STAT, tit. 15, § 159 (1961). 
25 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 164 (1961). 
26 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 16ll (1961). 
27 Harjo v. Harjo, 207 Okla. 73, 247 P.2d 522 (1952); Tyer v. Caldwell, 114 Okla. lll, 
242 Pac. 760 (1926); Withington v. Gypsy Oil Co., 68 Okla. lll8, 172 Pac. 6ll4 (1918); cf. 
Union Sugar Co., lll Cal. 2d l!OO, 188 P.2d 470 (1948). 
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effectuated, if this can be done lawfully. If the parties' intent can-
not be lawfully effectuated, the provisions relative thereto must be 
regarded as "amended and modified to the extent necessary to con-
form to the provisions of this [ unitization] Act .... "28 
III. EFFECT OF UNITIZATION ON THE AGREEMENT 
The argument for the plaintiffs below rested first upon the 
proposition that the provision for the deductions from the over-
riding royalty was based upon a method of operation which was 
forbidden by the Oklahoma unitization statute and was abandoned 
in response to the statutory command. Hence, they contended, the 
provision for that deduction must fall because of its inconsistence 
with the new legislative scheme. We think that this argument is 
sound for the following reasons. 
By the terms of the Agreement, which, as we have seen, must be 
read as a whole, S was to develop and operate the assigned land on 
an individual basis as to each t~act, utilizing its own judgment and 
discretion, but in competition with other tracts in the field. It was 
required to protect the assigned tracts against drainage from wells 
on adjacent land. It was required so to operate each tract as to 
secure the maximum production allowable by the state or federal 
authority having jurisdiction. It agreed to operate and develop the 
individual properties in a good and workmanlike manner at all 
times, and to manage and develop them in compliance with the 
"prudent operator" rule, which requires the exercise of reasonable 
diligence and care adequately to explore, develop, operate, and 
protect the property on an individual lease basis.29 S was not to 
shut down any paying well producing oil or gas, except for repairs, 
for reconditioning, or in accordance with an order of a state or 
federal officer, board, or agency. S was required to tender to Fa 
reassignment of tracts on which it determined to abandon wells, 
together with these wells. 
All these provisions constitute an integrated scheme whereby 
the assigned units were to be developed to, and operated at, maxi-
mum productivity. Thereby the F interests were given the utmost 
possible assurance against the contingency that the per-well 
monthly deductions might create deficits which would reduce their 
income or which, perhaps, might reduce future royalties. These 
28 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). 
20 See MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN On. AND GAS LEAsEs § 122 (2d ed. 1940) and 
authorities there cited. 
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provisions are so essential in reducing the risk of deficits that they 
must be taken to be "the basis on which" F "assented to the bar-
gain" and to create "a major part-an essential part-of the value 
of one of the performances (the per-well deduction] that the par-
ties" agreed "to exchange."80 As such, their continued effectiveness 
is "necessarily inherent in the actual performance of the contract,"81 
and cessation of the contract constitutes a fact which modifies the 
promise of F in respect to the per-well deduction. Therefore the 
express development and operation obligations undertaken by S 
are implied conditions on F's liability for the per-well deduction.82 
They are, in the language of the Oklahoma statute, the "object" of 
F's assent to the deduction,83 and the "consideration" therefor.a, 
The Oklahoma statutory law and the plan of unitization 
adopted under its authority, however, wipe out all these stipula-
tions in the following manner: 
A. For the judgment and discretion of S, the unitization sub-
stitutes the direction of the Operating Committee of the Unit. By 
statute the unit plan is to provide for "an operating committee to 
have general over-all management and control of the unit and the 
conduct of its business and affairs and the operations carried on 
by it. "85 The West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit Plan of U nitization 
constitutes the Operating Committee with a membership of one 
representative from each lessee within the unit area.86 In addition 
to giving the Committee general authority in the words of the 
statute,87 the Plan specifically vests the Committee with power to 
determine the extent of drilling operations and development;88 
with designation of which wells shall produce and at what rate; 811 
with the approval or disapproval of plans of development or opera-
tion to be submitted to regulatory bodies having jurisdiction over 
the subject matter;40 and with the prerogative to "direct and consult 
with the Unit Operator in all matters pertaining to the duties and 
functions of the Unit Operator."41 The Unit Operator is expressly 
80 6 CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 1355, at 465 (1962). 
81 5 WILusroN, CoNTRAcrs § 668 (3d ed. 1961). 
82 Ibid. 
83 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 101 (1961). 
84 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 106 (1961). 
85 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(e) (1961). 
86 Plan of Unitization, West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit [hereinafter referred to as 
Plan], § VIIl(l). 
87 Id. § VIII(2). 
38 Id. § VIII(2)(d). 
311 Id. § VIII(2)(f). 
40 Id. § VIII(2)(l). 
41 Id. § VIII(2)(n). 
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required to carry on and conduct "operations in connection with 
the development and the operation of the Unit Area for Oil and 
Gas ... in accordance with the instructions of the Operating Com-
mittee."42 This is in entire accord with the theory of unit operation, 
under which "the lessee surrenders to the discretion of the unit 
management the power to carry out" his obligations, express and 
implied, to other interests.43 However, it is entirely inconsistent 
with the obligations assumed by S in the Agreement. 
The extent to which these provisions require that the deter-
minations of the Unit Operating Committee supplant the judg-
ment and discretion of S is illustrated by West Edmond Hunton 
Lime Unit v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.44 In that case, the Unit was 
granted specific performance of a directive of the Unit Operating 
Committee, requiring the defendant, a lessee of land embraced in 
the unitized area, to turn over to the control of the Operating 
Committee a well which had been completed to produce oil from 
both the Hunton Lime and the Bartlesville Sand overlying the 
Hunton Lime. The well was to be transferred in such condition as 
to be capable of production from the Hunton Lime only. The Unit 
was also granted an injunction forbidding the defendant from using 
the well bore and equipment for production from the Bartlesville 
formation. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 
the Unit Operating Committee's orders could be reviewed only to 
determine whether they were "arbitrary, capricious and without 
any rational basis in fact. "45 It held that, in view of the evidence as 
to the possible adverse effect upon the activities of the Unit in the 
exploitation of the Hunton Lime, the prohibition against dual 
production from the two sands could not be held to be "arbitrary 
or capricious." Rather, it was "founded upon the technical knowl-
edge and judgment of those charged with the duty and responsibil-
ity of managing and operating the unit."46 Thus we see that, as to 
this matter, as the court of appeals said, "the decision is not com-
mitted to the owners of the dually completed wells .... "47 As a 
result of this decision, we see that the freedom of S to exercise its 
best judgment and discretion in the operation of the assigned tracts, 
as required by the Agreement, has been subjected to the control of 
42 Id. § X, at 12. 
43 See Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J. 1207, 1220 (1948). 
44 193 F.2d 818 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 920 (1952). 
45 Id. at 824. 
411 Id. at 825. 
47 Id. at 823. 
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the Operating Committee of the Unit, not only with respect to 
the Hunton Lime production, but also, to an important extent, 
with respect to the ability to produce from any other sand in the 
field which is not taken into the unit for exploitation. For instance, 
if twin wells must be drilled on any of these properties to exploit 
the Bartlesville Sand, provisions of section 4(b) of the Agreement 
would inflict upon F a doubling of the deduction as to that tract, 
although, but for the directive in question, the production from 
the two sands could be secured from a single well, with a single 
deduction. Obviously, in such a matter, the judgment and discre-
tion of Sis superseded by that of the Unit Operating Committee, 
contrary to the provisions of the Agreement. 
That this is no chimera is demonstrated by the Report of the 
Engineering Sub-Committee of the Unit, dated January 27, 1953, 
from which it appears that, as to wells embraced within the Agree-
ment of August 20, 1943, S indicated a desire to produce from the 
Bartlesville Sand, as well as from the Hunton, on seven tracts of 
the unit. Its discretion in this respect, however, was subjected to 
the oversight of the Sub-Committee and the Operating Committee. 
The report listed, as to those wells, the future destiny recommended 
for each of them in the unit operation and the extent to which dual 
completion would be prejudicial to these plans. Five of them were 
listed as future pumping wells, as to which it was indicated that 
dual production was impracticable. The two others were listed for 
future gas lift operation. For them, it was stated that there should 
be installed additional specialized equipment, at the expense of 
the Bartlesville Sand production, before the dual production 
would be approved by the Unit. Obviously the performance of 
the duties of S to F under the Agreement was seriously and sub-
stantially altered by the unitization, in a manner directly affecting 
the propriety of the per-well deduction. 
B. For the individual development and operation of the as-
signed tracts, the statute and the plan of unitization substituted 
unitized operation of the entire source of supply embraced in the 
Unit, without regard to lease boundaries or location of wells. Thus 
the statute requires the plan of unitization to include provision for 
the "efficient unitized management or control of the further devel-
opment and operation of the unit area for the recovery of oil and 
gas from the common source of supply affected."48 The order creat-
ing the unit is to provide "for the unitization and unitized opera-
48 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(a) (1961). 
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tion of the common source of supply or portion thereof described 
in the order .... "49 "From and after the effective date" of the crea-
tion of a unit, "the operation of any well producing from the com-
mon source of supply or portion thereof within the unit area 
defined in the order . . . except in the manner and to the extent 
provided in such plan of unitization shall be unlawful and is hereby 
prohibited."50 Further provision was made for unitization of obliga-
tions arising under individual leases: 
"Unit production as that term is used in this Act shall 
mean and include all oil and gas produced from a unit area 
from and after the effective date of the order of the Commis-
sion creating the unit regardless of the well or tract within the 
unit area from which the same is produced."51 
"Operations carried on under and in compliance with the 
plan of unitization shall be regarded and considered as a ful-
fillment of and compliance with all of the provisions, cove-
nants, and conditions, express or implied, of the several oil 
and gas mining leases upon lands included within the unit 
area, or other contracts pertaining to the development thereof, 
insofar as said leases or other contracts may relate to the com-
mon source of supply or portion thereof included in the unit 
area."52 
The Plan of U nitization provides that its adoption and the 
creation of the Unit "shall have the effect from and after the Effec-
tive Date hereof of unitizing all further development and opera-
tions for the production of Oil and Gas from the Unit Area and of 
pooling and unitizing the production so obtained, all to the same 
extent as if the Unit Area had been included in a single lease and 
all rights thereunder owned by the Lessees in undivided inter-
ests. "58 
C. For the obligation to drill wells on each tract in accordance 
with the prudent operator rule, there is substituted a restriction of 
drilling to such wells as the Unit Operating Committee may au-
thorize. 54 The Plan of U nitization makes it the function of that 
Committee to "determine the extent of drilling operations and 
development to be carried on by the Unit Operator, including the 
40 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961). 
ISO OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.7 (1961). 
51 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(b) (1961). 
112 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961); see Plan § VI, at 4. 
58 Plan § VI, at 8. 
54 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.7 (1961). 
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approval or disapproval of the contemplated drilling, deepening, 
plugging back, reconditioning, abandonment or the use to be made 
of any well or wells."515 "Wells drilled or operated on any part of 
the unit area no matter where located shall for all purposes be 
regarded as wells drilled on each separately-owned tract within 
such unit area."56 All this accords with the general principle of unit 
operation, whereby development within the unitized tract, though 
not on the leased premises, complies with the operator's obligation 
to develop the leased premises; 57 but it is in diametric opposition to 
the advantages secured to F by the provision of the Agreement for 
the development of each tract in accordance with the obligation of 
the prudent operator. 
D. For the obligation to protect each tract against drainage 
by wells on neighboring lands, there is substituted the bringing of 
all production into hotchpot,58 and the principle that offsetting 
obligations do not apply between tracts within the same unit. 511 
E. For the obligation to operate each well to secure the maxi-
mum productivity allowable under the conservation laws, there is 
substituted production from such wells and at such a rate as the 
Unit Operating Committee shall determine.60 As to wells "making 
water," operation shall be directed, not to achieve maximum pro-
ductivity, but "to minimize water encroachment into the Unit 
Area," and to "retard, control or effe'ctively utilize such water en-
croachment."61 
F. For the obligation not to shut down any well producing oil 
or gas in paying quantities, and for the stipulation that "all produc-
ing wells will be operated at all times,"62 there is substituted a 
wholesale program of shutting in wells.63 These restrictions on pro-
1,5 Plan § VIII(2)(d). 
56 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). 
57 Hardy v. Union Producing Co., 207 La. 137, 20 So. 2d 734 (1945). 
58 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 287.4(b), 287.9 (1961). 
59 Hood v. Southern Prod. Co., 206 La. 642, 19 So. 2d 336 (1944). 
60 Plan § VIII(2)(f). 
61 Id. § XV(b). 
62 Agreement § 5. 
63 Thus section XV of the Plan of Unitization provides: 
"(d) The oil produced from the Unit Area shall be produced from those wells .•• from 
which the same can be obtained with the smallest loss or dissipation of reservoir energy 
reasonably possible under practicable operating conditions as they may exist from time 
to time. 
"(e) Gas wells and wells which produce oil with gas-oil ratios found to be excessive in 
relation to the gas-oil ratios of other wells producing oil from the Unit Area shall be 
shut in or the production therefrom restricted in such manner as to make the most 
effective utilization of the gas energy of the reservoir reasonably possible under practical 
operating conditions as they may exist from time to time. 
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duction were regarded as one of the most beneficial incidents of 
this unitization.6¼ 
Moreover, the exception in the Agreement that wells are to 
be shut in only "pursuant to an order, rule, or regulation of any 
officer, board or agency, state or federal," 65 is superseded by the 
authority granted to the Unit, as outlined above. This Unit clearly 
is not a state or federal officer, board or agency, within the meaning 
of the Agreement. By statutory definition, it functions "on behalf 
and for the account of all the owners of the oil and gas rights within 
the unit area ... to supervise, manage and conduct the further 
development and operations for the production of oil and gas from 
the unit area .... "66 It holds possession of the property which it 
uses in the course of its operations "as agent of the several lessees 
••• .''
67 It does not wield the governmental authority of the state 
through the issuance of orders, rules or regulations. True, the Unit 
is described as a "body politic and corporate,"68 and it does play an 
important role in implementing Oklahoma's public policy to pro-
mote the conservation of oil and gas. But its general features ap-
proximate much more closely those of a private institution than 
those of a public authority. It has been suggested that it is likely 
that the analogies of private law, rather than those of public law, 
will be applied to most of its dealings.69 Indeed, the Unit engages 
in the essentially private enterprise of developing and operating 
an oil field under statutory authority. Yet its determinations may 
shut in wells, contrary to the terms of the Agreement. While, for 
the field as a whole, and in the long run, restrictions of this sort, 
and of the other varieties previously discussed, may work out ad-
vantageously, it is obvious that, in connection with the hotchpot 
distribution of proceeds, they seriously restrict the monthly income 
apportionable to particular tracts. Thus they reduce the ability of 
"(f) Gas (other than gas produced in connection with production of oil) shall be produced 
from the Unit Area only at such time or times and in such manner as in the judgment 
of the Operating Committee such gas may be produced without materially decreasing the 
quantity of oil economically recoverable from the Unit Area." 
64 "Unitization will immediately permit the selective production of wells. This will 
result in a substantial reduction in the daily gas production and at the same time the 
daily oil production from the field will be maintained at its present level or increased." 
See Barnes, West Edmond's Unitization and Gas Injection Project Would Be One of 
Largest, Oil and Gas J., Dec. 14, 1946, pp. 70, 71. 
61S Agreement § 7. 
66 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.8 (1961). 
67 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). 
68 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.8 (1961). 
60 See Merrill, The Legal Status of a Statutory Oil and Gas Production Unit, 10 
OKLA. L. REv. 249, 254 (1957). 
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the overriding royalty share to sustain the per-well deduction as 
compared with its ability to do so under operation on an indi-
vidual basis according to the standards set by the Agreement. 
G. For the "one-half of the crude oil, gas, casinghead gas and 
other hydro-carbons produced, saved, and marketed from said 
leasehold premises or the proceeds thereof accruing to the working 
interests assigned or transferred hereunder" reserved to F by the 
Agreement, the Plan of Unitization substitutes a similar share of 
the "amount of the unit production allocated to each separately-
owned tract within the unit, and only that amount, regardless of 
the well or wells within the unit area from which it may be pro-
duced, and regardless of whether it may be more or less than the 
amount of the production from the well or wells, if any, on any 
such separately owned tract."70 This proportion is to be determined 
by a formula which "will reasonably permit persons otherwise en-
titled to share in or benefit by the production from such separately-
owned tracts to produce or receive, in lieu thereof, their fair, equi-
table and reasonable share of the unit production or other benefits 
thereof." This "fair, equitable and reasonable share of the unit 
production shall be measured by the value of each such tract for 
oil and gas purposes and its contributing value to the unit in rela-
tion to like values of other tracts in the unit, taking into account 
acreage, the quantity of oil and gas recoverable therefrom, location 
on structure, its probable productivity of oil and gas in the absence 
of unit operations, the burden of operation to which the tract will 
or is likely to be subjected, or so many of said factors, or such other 
pertinent engineering, geological, or operating factors, as may be 
reasonably susceptible of determination."71 This allocation is set 
up in Exhibit B to the Plan of Unitization and is approved and 
adopted in section VII of the Plan. 
In contrast to this scheme, by the law as it existed at the execu-
tion of the Agreement between F and S, the production realizable 
from each separate tract was determinable by the "Law of Cap-
ture," limited only to the extent prescribed by the Oklahoma con-
servation laws.72 Under that law, the actual production from the 
70 Plan § VI, at 4. 
71 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(b) (1961). 
72 "The law of capture, under which oil and gas is owned by the one lawfully re-
ducing it to possession, still obtains in Oklahoma, except as it has been or may be regu-
lated or restricted under laws passed in the exercise of the police power, such as the 
proration and spacing statutes and city zoning ordinances. Those laws do not abrogate 
the rule of capture." Gruger v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 192 Okla. 259, 262, 135 P.2d 485, 488 
(1943). This opinion, filed Feb. 16, 1943, was the latest exposition of the law of Oklahoma 
when the Agreement of August 20, 1943, was executed. 
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various tracts, subject to conservation regulations, was limited only 
by the diligence and the efficiency of the operations. S might cap-
ture more than the fair share of the tracts he was operating, if by 
promptitude and skill he could do so.73 Such diligence and effi-
ciency S had contracted expressly to exercise, by the provisions 
heretofore set out. Had this not been provided, the law would have 
imposed the duty by implication.74 
How different is the situation of F under the Plant As has been 
aptly said, "With unitization, every operator and royalty owner 
receives a fixed percentage of revenue from the entire field."75 The 
elements specified for determining the allocation of the proceeds 
from this unitized operation differ entirely from, and are more 
limiting than, the conditions of operation for which F contracted. 
They materially and adversely affect the prospect of earning income 
sufficient to cover the specified per-well deductions plus a substan-
tial remainder for credit to the reserved override. This change 
could not have been, by any stretch of the imagination, within the 
contemplation of the parties in 1943 when the Agreement was 
executed, since there was then no unitization law upon the books. 
The trial court thought that the Agreement should not be 
regarded as calling for "competitive exploitation," but rather as 
contemplating the possibility of unitization and making no provi-
sion for the effect thereof on the provision for the per-well deduc-
tion. 76 This it deduced from the provision that paying wells should 
not be shut in, except for repairs or reconditioning, "unless pursu-
ant to an order, rule or regulation of any officer, board or agency, 
state or federal." 77 The appellate court somewhat blunted the force 
of this argument by saying that this clause referred to "govern-
mental regulation in general and not to unitization exclusively," 
capping this off by saying that, in any event, the finding was unnec-
essary. 78 Concerning this last, the only comment we have to make 
is that we are reminded of the lawyer whose argument was inter-
rupted by the interjection from the bench, "That's not the law"; 
he responded, "It was until Your Honor just spoke." The statement 
73 Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Larkins, 168 Okla. 69, 31 P.2d 608 (1934); 
cf. Wood Oil Co, v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950). 
M Cosden v. Carter Wolf Drilling Co., 183 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1950); see MERRILL, op. 
cit. supra note 29, § 188. 
75 See Barnes, supra note 64, at 71. 
76 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743, 755 (N.D. 
III. 1960). 
77 Agreement § 5. 
78 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 
1961). 
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of the appellate court amounts to an assertion that the contempla-
tion of the parties has no relevance to the interpretation of con-
tractual language or to its continued effect when confronted by a 
cataclysmic change in governmental policy. This position is unique, 
to say the least.79 
As to the notions that the contractual language referred either 
to a unitization program specifically or to any conceivable sort of 
governmental regulation that might be invented in the future, these 
cannot stand when we realize that there were in effect at the time 
the Agreement was formed numerous Oklahoma statutes relative 
to prorationing of production, well-spacing, the prevention of 
wasteful methods of production, and the like,80 under which wells 
could be shut in. Leases and other contractual documents relating 
to oil interests had long contained clauses designed to relieve opera-
tors from the risks that orders of this kind might be held insufficient 
protection against liability for failure to perform their contractual 
responsibilities.81 Parties to these stipulations clearly would have in 
mind the effects of orders of this sort upon the competitive opera-
tions with which they were familiar. It requires an extreme effort 
of the imagination to assume that the provisions in question were 
intended to preserve the deduction stipulations unaltered under a 
regulatory regime diametrically opposed to the condition of ex-
ploitation under which these contracts were designed to operate. 
H. The option of F to take over wells abandoned by S82 is in 
conflict with many provisions of the statute and the Plan of U nitiza-
tion, which, therefore, supersede it. Under the statute the Plan 
is required to set up a basis "upon which wells, equipment and 
other properties of the several lessees within the unit area are to 
be taken over and used for unit operations,"88 thereby disabling S 
from transferring abandoned wells and equipment to F. Moreover, 
F could not take over abandoned wells to operate on an individual 
basis, as contemplated by the Agreement, since "the operation of 
any well producing from the common source of supply or portion 
thereof within the unit area defined in the order by persons other 
79 See 6 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 30, §§ 1353-61; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1954 (Rev. 
ed. 1938). 
80 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 81-303 (1961). 
81 See BROWN, On. AND GAs LEAsEs § 13.03 (1958); Merrill, Lease Clauses Affecting 
Implied Covenants, in SOUTiiWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, SECOND ANNUAL lNSrITUTE ON 
OIL AND GAS LAw AND TAXATION 141, 189 (1951); Terry, Miscellaneous Clauses in Oil and 
Gas Leases, in id. at 237, 264 (1951). 
82 Agreement § 14. 
83 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(d) (1961). 
1964] COMPULSORY UNITIZATION 397 
than the unit or persons acting under its authority or except in 
the manner and to the extent provided in such plan of unitization 
shall be unlawful and is hereby prohibited."84 Wells to be aban-
doned are to be turned back only to the lessee, to be utilized only 
"for the purpose of completing the same in some other formation 
not a part of the Unit Area."85 The lessee must "agree to assume full 
responsibility for the proper plugging and abandonment thereof 
at such time as the well is ultimately abandoned."86 The incompat-
ibility of these provisions with a surrender of such wells and their 
equipment to F by S is apparent. F's option to take over wells 
abandoned by S is so important a protection to the former against 
the effects of the per-well deduction that it is impossible for us to 
conceive how the courts below could have held that the deduction 
provision survived its abrogation. Their opinions are regrettably 
silent upon this most significant point. The learned courts below 
make no reference to this destruction of the royalty owner's privi-
leges correlative to the benefits granted the lessee, or to the in-
congruity that the one should survive and not the other. 
From the recitation of the above items, it is clear that the law 
and the plan of operation adopted under the law have abrogated 
so many of the provisions of the Agreement governing the condi-
tions under which the per-well deduction was to be made as com-
pletely to change the circumstances surrounding the operation of 
the assigned properties and to alter to the detriment of F the obliga-
tions upon which he could rely to keep the production up to levels 
which would assure a return to him after the per-well deductions 
had been made. This calls into operation the principle that when 
a change in law forbids the performance of an essential condition 
of a contractual obligation, the obligation also ceases.87 
IV. THE SUPERSEDING CHARACTERISTICS OF UNITIZATION 
The supersession, by unitization, of agreements touching the 
individual properties incorporated in the unit has been recognized 
repeatedly by other courts. 
In Griswold v. Public Serv. Co.,88 the Supreme Court of Okla-
a, OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.7 (1961). 
811 Plan § XXIV. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Davidson v. Gaskill, 32 Okla. 40, 121 Pac. 649 (1913); accord, American Mercantile 
Exch. v. Blunt, 102 Me. 128, 66 Atl. 212 (1906); Midwood Sanitarium v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., 261 N.Y. 381, 185 N.E. 674 (1933); Cole v. Addison, 153 Ore. 688, 58 P.2d 1013 
(1936). 
88 205 Okla. 412, 415, 238 P.2d 322, 325-26 (1951). 
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homa held that royalty provisions of individual leases were super-
seded by unitization, saying, "Their lease was communitized ... 
and thereafter royalties were payable under the communitized 
lease, and not under their lease." 
In Beene v. Midstates Oil Corp.,89 the plaintiff was lessor under 
a lease to the defendant which, in addition to the normal royalty, 
reserved to the plaintiff an overriding royalty of an additional one-
eighth, calculated on the production from each well separately, 
which was to be reduced to one-sixteenth as to any well "for such 
period ... as such well is not capable of producing 50 barrels of 
oil per day when operated by a competent operator utilizing effi-
cient and practicable methods and equipment for producing oil 
and gas." Later, the lease was combined with other lands in a field-
wide unit. The plaintiff, as lessor, as well as the defendant, as lessee, 
executed the unitization agreement. That agreement contained 
provisions for the operation of the area as a unit; provided a for-
mula for the apportionment of the unitized production among the 
individual tracts; and specified that "payments to all Operators and 
Royalty Owners are to be made on the basis of an assumed produc-
tion in the amount or value of the Unitized Substances allocated 
under the agreement to each Production Unit in lieu of the actual 
production from each Production Unit" and that "payments made 
upon the basis herein stipulated shall constitute full performance 
of all obligations to pay rentals, royalties and all other sums what-
soever which may become payable to Royalty Owners. . . ." It 
further provided, in language strikingly similar to that of the 
Oklahoma statute,90 that "existing permits, leases, pooling agree-
ments, drilling and operating contracts, overriding royalty agree-
ments, or other instruments affecting the lands covered by this 
agreement owned or held by the parties subscribing or consenting 
hereto, shall continue in full force and effect to the extent that they 
or any one or more thereof, are not in conflict with the provisions 
of or are not modified by this agreement, but in case of conflict the 
provisions of this agreement during its effectiveness shall govern 
and control, and such other agreements shall be and the same are 
hereby modified and amended accordingly.''91 Under the operations 
in accordance with that agreement some wells were shut down, 
some were used for water injection, and some were used for gas 
injection. The point at issue between the plaintiff and the defend-
so 169 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1948). 
90 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). 
91 Beene v. Midstates Oil Corp., 169 F.2d 901, 906, 907 (8th Cir. 1948). 
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ant was whether, as to certain wells to which the proportion as-
signed from the total unit production turned out at certain periods 
to be less than fifty barrels per day, the override should be paid on 
the basis of one-eighth or one-sixteenth for those periods. These 
wells had produced better than fifty barrels per day prior to unitiza-
tion, and it was the plaintiff's contention that they were still capable 
of such production if operated on the basis prescribed in the lease. 
The court, in denying their contention that payment should be on 
the basis of one-eighth of the allocated return, said: 
"The plan of the Agreement for consummating payment to 
the royalty owner is complete and it is clear that all such pay-
ments shall be made on the basis of an assumed production 
calculated and arrived at according to prescribed formula. 
It precludes resort to other bases of calculation to arrive at 
payments due any interested party by its specific provisions 
and its whole scheme for production and calculation and dis-
tribution of benefits is inconsistent with and in contrast to 
the use of actual or natural flow production of any well as a 
basis of calculation of a royalty or overriding royalty interest. 
The only basis contemplated for determining such interests is 
the assumed basis produced by the technical method of reckon-
ing set forth in minute detail in the Agreement. An allocation 
made on that basis is the only measure of individual interest 
contemplated by the Agreement. 
"Such assumed basis is in conflict with the basis of calcula-
tion of payments provided in the royalty and overriding roy-
alty provisions of the lease. Both the one-eighth royalty and 
the one-eighth override were according to the lease to be calcu-
lated on the basis of the saved product of each well and ad-
mittedly the Agreement supersedes and supplies a new basis 
for both those calculations, the new basis being the 'allocation' 
provided for by the Agreement. The substitution of the 'alloca-
tion' for the former basis of actual production does not result 
because of express words of substitution in the Agreement. It 
follows from the conflict between the old basis defined in the 
lease and the new basis defined in the Agreement and the 
declaration of the Agreement that the new shall control over 
the old."02 
The significance of the Beene decision, as applied to the prob-
lem here involved, is twofold. (1) The decision recognizes that the 
supersession of individual agreements by the unitization plan, al-
112 Id. at 908. 
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though stated, as in the Oklahoma statute, to be limited to instances 
of conflict with or modification by the unitization plan, extends 
to provisions which are not verbally in conflict with or modified 
by the plan, but are necessarily involved with a method of exploita-
tion which has been superseded by the plan. The continued capa-
bility of the wells to produce under the competitive conditions 
contemplated by the lease could have been determined, just as, in 
the instant situation, the per-well deduction can be determined. 
But, in each case, the continued effectiveness of the stipulation is 
inconsistent with the conditions of operation brought into play by 
unitization. (2) The court expressly recognizes that unitization con-
stitutes "a pooled operation aimed at getting the most out of the 
area by efficient methods, excluding the concept of competitive 
production from one well against another .... " 98 Consequently, 
the provisions of a contract designed to operate under conditions 
of competitive production, as the provisions of the Agreement of 
August 20, 1943, have been shown to be intended, cannot survive 
unitization. 
In Waller v. Midstates Oil Corp.,94 the lessors had reserved an 
overriding royalty in addition to the customary one-eighth. It was 
provided that the override should cease, as to any drilling unit, 
"when the well or wells on any such particular unit ceases to flow 
oil without being pumped or produced by other artificial means." 
At the time of unitization, all the wells on the premises were flow-
ing, or were capable of flowing, oil, without resort to pumping or 
to other artificial means. The unitization became effective, with the 
assent of the lessors. Some of the wells in question were killed and 
used for injection wells. The lessor contended "that the whole field 
is being produced by mechanical means and that ended the excess 
royalty due plaintiffs." The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled to 
the contrary, adopting the expressed opinion of the trial judge: 
"[W]e think that since the individual leases with respect to the 
production of oil therefrom have lost their identity, that of 
necessity the leases lost their identity as excess royalty based 
on the manner of production of oil from the leased premises, 
and that the excess royalties were transferred from '7 / 8 of the 
oil produced from the respective drilling units' to '7 / 8 of the 
oil allocated to this drilling unit' just the same as the 1 / 18th 
[sic] underlying royalty was handled. It would certainly be 
unfair and unjust to the land owner to say to him that we have 
98 Id. at 909. 
94 218 La. 179, 48 So. 2d 648 (1950). 
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drilled your wells and used them for injection wells and since 
we are producing no oil from your lease, we will pay you no 
royalty-they didn't say this; they said we will pay you on the 
agreed percentage of production in the field just as if the oil 
was produced from your well. There can be no sound reason 
why the same procedure should not, and was not followed with 
respect to overriding royalties. We think the agreement gives 
the answer, it does."95 
The significant aspect of the case is that the court held that the pro-
vision relative to termination of the override, when wells cease "to 
flow without being pumped or produced by other artificial means," 
had no continued validity after the operation of the field was 
shifted, from the competitive basis in respect to which that pro-
vision was drafted, to a unitized basis. As the court said, "We think 
that if defendant had said to plaintiffs, if you will sign this instru-
ment, we will put the field on a mechanical basis, and that will stop 
your overriding royalty, they would never have secured the signa-
tures of these plaintiffs to the agreement."96 So, here, had it been 
said to F that the per-well deduction97 would survive the competi-
tive operation of the assigned properties, the individual disposi-
tion of all produced hydro-carbons, and the effectiveness of the 
eight distinct features of the contract, all of which facets tended to 
assure to Fa productiveness from individual tracts adequate to sup-
port the deduction (yet all of which were superseded by unitiza-
tion), we think it clear that F never would have assented to that 
deduction. 
We think that portion of section 4 of the Agreement which re-
lates to the per-well deduction is so utterly inconsistent with the 
program of development and operation set up for the West Edmond 
Hunton Lime Unit by the statute and the Plan of U nitization 
adopted therefor as to fall within the terms of the provision that 
"Property rights, leases, contracts and all other rights and obliga-
tions shall be regarded as amended and modified to the extent neces-
sary to conform to the provisions and requirements of this Act and 
to any valid and applicable plan of unitization or order of the 
Commission made and adopted pursuant hereto .... " 08 
The courts below attempted to evade the force of this statutory 
language by saying that the unitization did not render impossible 
95 See Waller v. Midstates Oil Corp., supra note 94, at 196, 48 So. 2d at 654. 
06 Ibid. 
97 Agreement § 4. 
98 OKI.A, STAT, tit. 52, § 297.9 (1961). 
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the performance of the provision for the per-well deduction.99 
This is true enough, in the sense that, as a matter of arithmetic, 
the allowance can be ascertained, and can be deducted from the 
share of the unit production allotted to each tract. But the functions 
which this allowance was to fulfill' no longer are realizable. The sup-
positions on which it was based are gone with the old law. What 
sort of justice is it which allows S to continue enjoyment of the 
allowance after its utility has vanished? That its sole objective was 
to compensate S for expenses in connection with operating under 
conditions now eliminated by the statutory unitization we think is 
manifest. 
In the first place, this is made clear by the terms of the Agree-
ment itself. Section 6 requires S to furnish F, monthly "a full, com-
plete and itemized statement of all receipts and disbursements in 
connection with the development and operation of the aforesaid 
properties during the preceding calendar month and to permit F 
at any time upon request to examine the books and records of S 
or of its subsidiary operating said premises in so far as the same 
pertain to such operations." Since F's override is a carried interest, 
"free and clear of all development and operating expense," the 
only need which F could have for such statements and for access 
to the books and records of S relating to the development and 
operation of the premises would be to determine the advisability 
of exercising the two options reserved to F: (1) to eliminate from 
the contract wells which run deficits for ninety days or more100 
and (2) to take over wells which S determines to abandon.101 In 
forecasting the probable future profitability of wells, the compari-
son of the operating expense with the gross income and the per-well 
deduction would be of vital significance, from the standpoint of 
both S and F. The existence of the deduction would be a factor 
inducing S to continue operation of a well beyond the time when 
otherwise it might desire to abandon or to turn it back; it would 
also be a factor in the determination by F as to whether continued 
operation, after the deduction was eliminated, would be profitable. 
Similarly, the comparison of operating expense with income would 
be of significance to F in appraising on the one hand whether defi-
cits from a particular well likely would be permanent and, on the 
other hand, whether, even with the per-well deduction, there was 
99 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743, 760 (1960): 
Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 280 (1961). 
100 Agreement § 4(2). 
101 Agreement § 13. 
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likely to be a continuing operating loss which would lead S to prof-
fer a return of the well. These factors would have a potent bearing 
on the propriety of a determination to release a particular tract 
from the override. The courts below seem nowhere to have given 
cognizance to this aspect of the problem. 
Again, the manner in which the deduction is established shows 
its character as a contribution to operating expenses. The override 
is set up first, "free and clear of all development and operating ex-
pense." When, therefore, something is taken from this "free and 
clear" one-half, the deduction must be, in some form, a contribu-
tion, out of the part reserved, to expense. If the subtraction were 
to be a mere cutting down of the original reservation, that could 
have been accomplished more easily and more appropriately by 
limiting the extent of the retention rather than by making the 
reservation subject to a deduction. Also, the first item of subtrac-
tion, the one-half of the amount of an oil payment payable to 
another oil company, clearly is a contribution to the expense of 
exploitation of the leases from which the oil payment is due. The 
principle "noscitur a sociis" is applicable to the interpretation of 
contracts.102 "The whole of a contract is to be taken together, ... 
each clause helping to interpret the others."103 Finally, the increase 
of the drawback by fifty dollars per month as to each well produc-
ing more than ten percent water shows clearly that the deduction 
is intended as a contribution to operating expense, since the 
presence of salt water in production necessitates additional ex-
penditures for the separation and disposition of the water.104 
Moreover, the necessity of such a special provision for contri-
bution to operating expense is obsolete under unitization. Unitiza-
tion completely alters the conditions under which the field is 
operated. By substituting cooperation for competition in develop-
ment and production, unitized operation reduces costs and capital 
outlays; at the same time, by increasing ultimate recovery, it adds to 
the net profit of the producers. This is the recognized objective of 
the Oklahoma unitization law. The Corporation Commission, in 
order to establish a unit, is required to find that unitized operation 
"will with reasonable probability result in the increased recovery of 
substantially more oil and gas from the common source of supply 
than would otherwise be recovered," and that the additional cost of 
such operation "will not exceed the value of the additional oil and 
102 See 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 618(3) (3d ed. 1961). 
103 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 157 (1961). 
104 See CLOUD, PETROLEUM PRODUCTION 469-82, 501-11 (1937). 
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gas so recovered."105 The achievement of such results has been one 
of the prime arguments of the advocates of unitized production 
methods. It has been said that, because of the "economies ... real-
ized through unitization, the small operator usually finds money 
demands on him substantially smaller than under a system of 
individual lease operation."100 "Large economies result through 
avoiding duplication of equipment, through centralized manage-
ment, and in other ways."107 Other writers lay stress upon the econ-
omies in development and operation costs realizable through unit 
operation.108 Reports on established projects indicate that they 
achieve this objective.100 Specifically, a similar consummation has 
been asserted for the West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit.110 
The increased production accomplished by unitization was 
achieved through the shutting down of over 200 wells, with a result-
ant reduction of the cost of operation, yet with a higher return to 
the operators. According to a report made as of the close of 1952, 
105 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961). 
100 See Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J. 1207, 1223 (1948). 
107 See Myers, Spacing, Pooling and Field-Wide Unitization, 18 MISS. L.J. 267, 271-72 
(1947). 
108 See CLOUD, op. cit. supra note 104, at 71; Caruthers, Procedures-Benefits-Prob-
lems-of Unitization, Oil and Gas J., July 28, 1949, pp. 302, 304•05; German, Compulsory 
Unit Operation of Oil Pools, 17 A.B.A.J. 393, 399 (1931); Heath, Unitization Desirable in 
Secondary Recovery, World Oil, Oct. 1949, p. 48. 
109 See Gray, Five Years of Operating at Langlie Unitized Repressuring Project, Oil 
and Gas J., Nov. 16, 1946, pp. 295, 297; Landis &: Brock, Four Case Histories Showing Why 
It Pays To Unitize, Oil and Gas J., July 7, 1952, pp. 62, 63. 
110 "For September, the last month prior to unitization, the field's allowable was 
40,000 bbl. and production was 34,907 bbl. The unit asked the Corporation Commission 
to grant an increase of 5,000 bbl. of oil a day and this was granted as of October 1. It 
was planned to obtain this additional production by shutting in high-gas-oil ratio wells 
and thus conserve this reservoir energy for increasing the productivity of the other wells 
in the field. Thus 165 wells had been shut in by November 1, and by November 15 the 
total had reached 225. For the month of October, the field produced a daily average of 
46,331 bbl. or slightly in excess of the increased allowable. The report prepared on the 
field by the West Edmond Engineering Committee stated that, through selective produc-
tion alone, an additional 10 million barrels of oil will be recovered." McCaslin, Nation'3 
Largest Unit Operation Accomplishes Much in First Three Months, Oil and Gas J., Jan. 
I, 1948, pp. 44, 46. 
"It has been estimated that without unitization, approximately 24 per cent of the total 
wells in the pool would have been abandoned by 1952, and that by that time all pro-
ducing wells would have been placed on the pump. By the end of 1957, all wells would 
have been abandoned. Under Unitization, selectivity in shutting in of high-gas-oil-ratio 
wells alone may extend the producing life to 1959 or later. With a gas-injection program 
added, the producing life of the field should extend to 1965 or later." 
"The 32 operating interests, the state, and the estimated 7,000 land and royalty owners 
should all benefit from the unitization. During the hearings before the Corporation Com-
mission, Don R. Knowlton, consulting engineer, stated that unit operation would mean an 
additional $16,000,000 for royalty owners, and an additional $6,800,000 in gross produc-
tion taxes for the state." Id. at 62, 63. 
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the average daily production was 6,035 barrels.111 This was pro-
duced through 506 wells, out of a total of 750 credited to the field. 
Adding 15 water input wells, there were a total of 521 wells in 
operation, with 229 not in operation. A total of I 02 wells were shut 
in because of an uneconomically high gas-oil ratio; 19 were listed 
as dead, of which three were tagged as not economical to correct. 
Six wells were labeled as marginal artificial lift wells permanently 
shut down; 77 were plugged and abandoned, and three more had 
been approved for that purpose, while 22 more apparently were 
abandoned for Hunton Lime production, being marked "returned 
to former lessee." In brief, for the field as a whole, production was 
being achieved through less than 70 percent of the total wells, as 
against 76 percent to be expected in operation under competitive 
conditions. The engineering estimate as to results under competi-
tive production was that, by 1952, all producing wells would have 
been placed on the pump, while actually, in December 1952, 337 
wells, nearly two-thirds of the producing wells, were still flowing. 
Of the total production, over 56.07 percent came from these flowing 
wells. While under competitive conditions it was estimated that 24 
percent of the wells would have been abandoned by this time, over 
30 percent were not in operation under unitization. The saving in 
operating costs resulting from these features of unitized operation, 
as compared with competitive production, is obvious. For instance, 
361 flowing wells cost only, on the average, 78 dollars each to oper-
ate in March 1953, whereas the average cost of operating 171 pump-
ing wells in the same month was 328 dollars. The monthly operat-
ing cost of the unit declined from an average of 126,444 dollars 
during 1948 to 83,062 dollars for the first four months of 1953.112 
For future operations, with natural flow no longer available, the 
Unit Operator contemplated employing two forms of gas lift, much 
cheaper than pumping,. that could be applied efficiently only 
through the unitized operation.118 
These savings, of course, redound to those who actually bear 
the expense of operation. This situation renders utterly obsolete 
the contribution of a flat sum per well, calculated as a proper con-
tribution to operating costs under competitive operation, to be 
made by the interests which, under unitization, are denied the right 
111 See Monthly Operations Report, ·west Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, December 
1952. 
112 See Analysis of Reservoir Performance, Operating Costs, and Future Operating 
Program of West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, June 1953, p. 145 
113 Id. at 157•65. 
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to enforce the obligation of diligence and skill in competitive pro-
duction, as well as the special competitive advantages which might 
inhere in their tracts' location, assured to them by the same Agree-
ment which provided the per-well contribution to operating costs. 
All the more is this true when, under unitization, the percentage ap-
plicable to their tracts is determined by many factors which have no 
relation to the competitive position of particular tracts. 
The inconsistence of the per-well deduction with the theory 
and practice of unitized operation is well expressed in the follow-
ing statement by one of the leading experts on such operations: 
"Ultimate recovery is substantially independent of the well 
spacing and of the number of wells drilled. It is time for the 
industry to waken up to this fact and realize that only pressure 
maintenance of reservoirs accomplishes maximum recovery. 
The amount of recovery from a pool is not to be determined in 
direct proportion to the number of wells drilled in proven 
pools."114 
An instance which clearly shows the distinction between unit-
ized and competitive operations so far as the position of the over-
riding royalty owner is concerned is that of the salt water injection 
program. This was undertaken in the hope that water :flooding 
would materially increase the production of oil. It dated from 
1949.115 The hope was disappointed.U6 Experience indicated that, 
at the very most, the project broke even; and it may have resulted 
in substantial losses of oil. It certainly trapped off large quantities 
of gas.117 It impeded maximum recovery of oil in certain areas.118 
As of 1953, it was proposed to abandon this program for other 
methods of salt water disposal.119 Without unitization, this venture 
into water-flooding could not have been made, and the owners of 
royalty interests would have been saved the resultant losses. 
To continue the life of the provision for deductions is also in 
direct conflict with an Oklahoma statutory provision which (1) re-
quires, as a prerequisite to an order establishing a unit, a finding by 
the Corporation Commission, "that such unitization and adoption 
of one or more of such unitized methods of operation is for the com-
114 See Kaveler, Progress Report on Unit Operation, Oil and Gas J., Nov. 8, 1951, 
p. 316. 
115 See Analysis of Reservoir Performance, Operating Costs, and Future Operating 
Program of West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, June 1953, pp. 13-16. 
116 Id. at 40-52. 
111 Id. at 52, 83, 122. 
118 Id. at 82, 83. 
119 Id. at 82-86. 
1964] COMPULSORY UNITIZATION 407 
mon good and will result in the general advantage of the owners of 
the oil and gas rights within the common source of supply or portion 
thereof directly affected"; and (2) requires that the unit, the unitiza-
tion, and unitized operation be "upon such terms and conditions 
as may be shown by the evidence to be fair, reasonable, equitable 
and which are necessary or proper to protect, safeguard and adjust 
the respective rights and obligations of the several persons affected, 
including royalty owners, owners of overriding royalties, oil and 
gas payments, carried interests, mortgagees, lien claimants and 
others, as well as the lessees."120 
These quoted provisions specifically establish the legislative 
intent that the effect of the altered conditions of development and 
operation brought about by unitization and unitized operation be 
beneficial to all interests concerned, including among such inter-
ests, by specific reference, "owners of overriding royalties." The 
program is not intended to benefit the lessee interests alone. As 
we read the opinions below, the continuance of the per-well deduc-
tion redounds exclusively to the advantage of the owner of the lessee 
interest and to the disadvantage of the owner of the overriding 
royalty interest. Therefore, it is in inescapable conflict with the pro-
visions quoted, and, by the express command of another section, 
the Agreement is "amended and modified to the extent necessary"121 
to conform to the provisions and requirements that the unitization 
and the unitized operation be "for the common good and ... result 
in the general advantage of the owners of the oil and gas rights 
within the common source of supply," and that the "rights and 
obligations of ... owners of overriding royalties ... as well as the 
lessees" be protected, safeguarded and adjusted.122 
Reduction in the earning capacity of the royalty interests is a 
common phenomenon of unitization.123 A leading purpose of uni-
fied operation is to decrease immediate production through elimi-
nating "the competitive race to produce."124 This has been a chief 
cause of opposition to unitization on the part of the owners of 
royalty interests,125 an opposition which doubtless was one of the 
120 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961). (Emphasis added.) 
121 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). 
l!l2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961). 
128 See Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 199 F.2d 1, 5 (10th Cir. 1952) (reduction from 
$35-50 per month to $6-7); Smith v. Carter Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952); 
Garvin, The Effect of Field Unit Operation Upon the Royalty Interest and the Royalty 
Under the Oklahoma Statute, 21 OKLA. B.A.J. 1793, 1795, 1797 (1950). 
124 Oliver, Methods of Determining Relative Oil and Gas Content of Individual Land 
Holdings in Common Pool, 17 A.B.A.J. 541 (1931). 
125 See Heath, supra note 108, at 51; King, Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas 
Leases, 46 Mrca. L. REv. 811, 827 (1948). 
408 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
strongest reasons for denying to the owners of such interests partici-
pation in proceedings for unitization under the original Oklahoma 
statute.126 On the other hand, to achieve the reduction of operating 
costs and the spreading of recovery over a long period, results re-
peatedly praised as objectives of unitization,127 at the expense of 
reduced returns or of the continuance of provisions tailored for 
conditions of competitive operation, as in the instant case, bears 
unjustly upon the owners of royalty interests. The per-well deduc-
tion, for instance, when applied to a period of prolonged and gradu-
ally declining production at lowered operating cost, is capable of 
wiping out entirely, through the closing years, the return to the 
overriding royalty interest. Thus it destroys the advantage of ex-
tended productivity, which, it has been declared, is a feature which 
justifies imposing upon the royalty owner a reduction in his "im-
mediate or current receipts."128 It seems clear that this is one of the 
results the avoidance of which is intended by the Oklahoma statu-
tory provision which we have quoted. It is noteworthy in this con-
nection that the propaganda in favor of the formation of this unit 
stressed the element of advantage to the royalty owners.129 There is 
a strange irony in the fact that two courts should now uphold the 
operating interest in combining pre-unitization contracts with 
unitized operation to the detriment of those owners who were 
given assurance of benefit. We think it clear that the continued 
deduction under the Agreement conflicts with the statutory pro-
visions above quoted, under the circumstances here presented. 
There is another statutory provision which collides with the 
continuance of the per-well deduction after unitization. This is 
the prescription that the "division of interest or formula for the 
apportionment and allocation of the unit production, among and 
to the several separately-owned tracts within the unit area" shall be 
"such as will reasonably permit persons otherwise entitled to share 
in or benefit by the production from such separately-owned tracts to 
produce or receive, in lieu thereof, their fair, equitable and rea-
sonable share of the unit production or other benefits thereof. . . . 
[U]nit production ... shall mean and include all oil and gas pro-
126 See Myers, supra note 107, at 274. 
127 See Jacobs, supra note 106, at 1210, 1224; Kaveler, The Engineering Basis for and 
the Results from the Unit Operation of Oil Pools, 23 TuL. L. REv. 331 (1949); Moses, 
The Effect of Louisiana's Conservation Statute on the Doctrine of Implied Covenants 
in Oil and Gas Leases, 27 TuL. L. REv. 313, 315 (1953); Myers, supra note 107, at 271-73. 
128 Patterson v. Stanolind Oil 8: Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P .2d 83, 89 (1938). 
129 See Barnes, West Edmond's Unitization and Gas Injection Project Would Be One 
of Largest, Oil and Gas J., Dec. 14, 1946, pp. 70, 71. 
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duced from a unit area from and after the effective date of the order 
of the Commission creating the unit regardless of the well or tract 
within the unit area from which the same is produced."130 
The Agreement provided that the per-well deduction should be 
made from "one-half of the crude oil, gas, casinghead gas, and other 
hydro-carbons produced, saved, and marketed from said leasehold 
premises or the proceeds thereof accruing to the working interests 
assigned and transferred hereunder." This enumeration comprised 
the sum of production from individual leaseholds, developed and 
operated on a competitive basis, under the compulsions of the 
specific obligations heretofore quoted. That individual production 
now has been wiped out by the statute and by the Plan of Unitiza-
tion. Instead, there is apportioned to each leasehold a share of total 
unit production, produced on a cooperative basis quite different 
from that envisaged by the Agreement and distributed among the 
tracts according to a formula based on elements entirely foreign to 
the competitive system of exploitation which was to be the source of 
each tract's yield under the Agreement. Consequently, the statute 
and the Plan of Unitization have completely destroyed the source 
from which the deduction was to come. They have substituted for 
it something quite different, to which the flat per-well deduction has 
no relevance and to which it is not adapted. In this respect, also, the 
Agreement must "be regarded as amended and modified to the 
extent necessary to conform to the provisions and requirements" 
of the statute and the Plan of Unitization. In the words used in 
Beene v. Midstates Oil Corp., these provisions "require the calcula-
tion of payments to be made ... on a basis different from and in 
conflict with that contemplated by and provided in the Agree-
ment."1s1 
It has been said that under unitization the royalty owner has 
"an interest in the entire field, whereas, before, his only interest was 
in his particular well or wells.''132 A share in such general ownership 
is in no way comparable with ownership of an interest in a particu-
lar tract under competitive production. 
Another inconsistence between the Agreement and the scheme 
of unitized operation is afforded by that portion of the Oklahoma 
statute reading: "Wells drilled or operated on any part of the unit 
area no matter where located shall for all purposes be regarded as 
130 OKLA, STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(b) (1961). 
131 169 F.2d 901, 909 (8th Cir. 1948). 
132 See McCaslin, Preplanned Program with Royalty Owners Followed in Newest Unit 
Project, Oil and Gas J., April 8, 1948, pp. 64, 65. 
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wells drilled on each separately-owned tract within such unit 
area."133 If this statement means anything, it is that for all purposes, 
including the computation of the per-well deduction, every one of 
the wells in production in the unit is to be regarded as located on 
each of the tracts embraced in the Agreement. This would boost 
the deduction to such astronomic proportions as obviously to be 
impractical. Clearly, the legislature would not intend this. Since the 
statute requires the application of the quoted concept "for all 
purposes," there is no way in which the per-well deduction may 
stand in harmony with it. Necessarily, then, it must be eliminated 
from the Agreement by the prescription that "contracts, and all 
other rights and obligations shall be regarded as amended and 
modified to the extent necessary to conform to the provisions and 
requirements of this Act." 
Let us now look to another portion of the Oklahoma Compulsory 
Unitization Statute, which establishes a statutory scheme for the 
distribution and payment of the operating expenses of the unit.111* 
First, the statute allots one-eighth of the unit production to be dis-
1ss OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). (Emphasis added.) 
lSi "The obligation or liability of the lessee or other owners of the oil and gas rights 
in the several separately-owned tracts for the payment of unit expense shall at all times 
be several and not joint or collective and in no event shall a lessee or other owner of 
the oil and gas rights in the separately-owned tract be chargeable with, obligated or 
liable, directly or indirectly, for more than the amount apportioned, assessed or otherwise 
charged to his interests in such separately-owned tract pursuant to the plan of unitization 
and then only to the extent of the lien provided for in this Act. 
"Subject to such reasonable limitations as may be set out in the plan of unitization, 
the unit shall have a first and prior lien upon the leasehold estate and other oil and gas 
rights (exclusive of a one-eighth (l/8) royalty interest) in and to each separately-owned 
tract, the interest of the owners thereof in and to the unit production and all equipment 
in the possession of the unit, to secure the payment of the amount of the unit expense 
charged to and assessed against such separately-owned tract. The interest of the lessee or 
other persons who by lease, contract or otherwise are obligated or responsible for the 
cost and expense of developing and operating a separately-owned tract for oil and gas 
in the absence of unitization, shall however, be primarily responsible for and charged 
with any assessment for unit expense made against such tract and resort may be had to 
overriding royalties, oil and gas payments; royalty interests in excess of one-eighth (1/8) 
of the production, or other interests which otherwise are not chargeable with such cost, 
only in the event the owner of the interest primarily responsible fails to pay such assess• 
ment or the production to the credit thereof is insufficient for that purpose. In the event 
the owner of any royalty interest, overriding royalty, oil and gas payment or other interest 
which under the plan of unitization is not primarily responsible therefor pays in whole 
m:: in part the amount of an assessment for unit expense for the purpose of protecting 
such interest, or the amount of the assessment in whole or in part is deducted from the 
unit production to the credit of such interest, the owner thereof shall to the extent of 
such payment or deduction be subrogated to all of the rights of the unit with respect to 
the interest or interests primarily responsible for such assessment. A one-eighth (1/8) part 
of the unit production allocated to each separately-owned tract shall in all events be 
regarded as royalty to be distributed to and among, or the proceeds thereof paid to, the 
royalty owners free and clear of all unit expense and free of any lien therefor." OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 52, § 287.8 (1961). 
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tributed to the royalty owners in each separately owned tract, pro-
portionately to the tract's allocation of production, "free and clear 
of all unit expense and free of any lien therefor." Second, the cost 
of operation is to be apportioned to each tract. In the West Edmond 
Hunton Lime Plan of Unitization, such apportionment is in "pro-
portion to the percentage of interest of such tracts in and to the 
Unit .... "135 Payment of this charge is secured by a lien in favor 
of the unit upon all the interests in the tract exceeding the amount 
allotted as royalty. Third, the primary responsibility for the assessed 
operating expenses is upon the lessee's or operator's interest, and 
"resort may be had to overriding royalties ... only in the event 
the owner of the interest primarily responsible fails to pay such 
assessment or the production to the credit thereof is insufficient 
for that purpose." If the owner of an interest thus secondarily liable 
pays any part of a unit expense assessment in order to protect his 
property, he is subrogated to the rights of the unit against the 
interest "primarily responsible for such assessment." 
In brief, the law establishes a pattern whereby the one-eighth 
royalty interest is clear of all liability for unit expenses, even if it is 
owned by the operator himself. The remaining seven-eighths inter-
est is chargeable, proportionately, with the unit expense; but, as 
between the operator's interest and overriding royalties or other 
non-operating interests, a real suretyship136 is created, whereby the 
holders of the non-operating interests are entitled to be reimbursed 
out of the operating interest for any payment made to discharge 
the assessment, and are subrogated, to that extent, to the lien of 
the unit against the operating interest. 
The inconsistence of this statutory scheme with section 4(b) 
of the Agreement is manifest. The statute imposes full secondary 
liability upon the override for all expense chargeable to the tract. 
The Agreement provides for a fl.at deduction of a specific sum, 
beyond which no responsibility attaches. The statute limits respon-
sibility to the proportionate share of the expenses chargeable 
against the tract. The Agreement provides for a fixed deduction, 
no matter how little the expenses. The statute creates a lien in favor 
of the unit against the override, which therefore may be foreclosed 
upon and sold to satisfy the expense. The Agreement creates no 
such liabilty against the override; it merely allows deficits to be 
carried over and to be taken out of future credits from production. 
181i Plan § XI. 
136 See STEARNS, SURETYsHIP § 1.3 (5th ed. 1951). 
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The statutory liability is limited to each separate tract; the Agree-
ment deduction is combined as to all tracts and is subtracted from 
"the gross proceeds of production accruing to the working interests 
from all wells on all of the leases" subject to the Agreement. The 
statutory liability is secondary, as we have seen; the Agreement 
deduction is absolute and cannot be shifted. 
The inconsistence of the statutory scheme and the Agreement 
is such that the latter cannot coexist practicably and justly with the 
former. In some respects the statute is more favorable to the over-
riding royalty interest than is the Agreement. In other respects it 
is more burdensome. Of course, in those respects in which the 
Agreement is more burdensome to the override than is the statute, 
the owner of the override is caught in a "heads I win, tails you 
lose" proposition wholly inconsistent with an express statutory 
policy that the unitization and unitized operation shall be "fair, 
reasonable and equitable" and shall be such as to "protect, safe-
guard and adjust the respective rights and obligations of ... owners 
of overriding royalties ... as well as the lessees."137 The Agreement 
provision for deductions, therefore, must yield in its entirety to the 
statutory arrangement. 
That the statutory scheme is intended to supersede special 
agreements and arrangements with regard to liability for operating 
expenses is stated by Mr. T. Murray Robinson, a leading proponent 
of the statute and long a member of the legal committee of the 
Interstate Oil Compact Commission: 
"On the theory that all tracts should be treated alike, the Okla-
homa Legislature made a realistic division [in the statute] of 
lessor and lessee interests in the production. It provides that 
a one-eighth of the unit production be free and clear of all unit 
expense and creates a lien against the remaining seven-
eighths interest in the unit tract and the production attribut-
able to that tract for the payment of development and operat-
ing costs."188 
Concerning the necessity for cutting across prior arrangements, 
Mr. Robinson said: 
"Obviously, situations will arise in which some of the tracts' 
share of the production can be obtained only by requiring 
137 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.3 (1961). 
138 See Robinson, Compulsory Unit Operation: Procedure, Proof, Validity and Legal 
Effect, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS 
LAW AND TAXATION 201, 219 (1951). 
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other tracts to contribute a greater share of the unit costs than 
their share of the production. Ordinarily this out-balance may 
be of little consequence in the earlier years of unit operation, 
but it may become substantial and destructive to the unit as it 
approaches its economic limit of operation. The failure of the 
laws [in some states] to establish a yardstick by which the 
lessors' and the lessees' interests are to be measured opens the 
door for making of deals in anticipation of unitization which 
easily result in unconscionable advantages to the cunning."189 
It may be added to this statement that, as our prior discussion 
reveals, the same unconscionable advantages may result from at-
tempts to apply to unitized operation, and the limitations it im-
poses, provisions which were drafted with a view to competitive 
conditions of exploitation. This is quite regardless of any degree 
of Machiavellianism in either of the contracting parties and il-
lustrates the wisdom of holding prior arrangements of this sort to 
be superseded by a specific statutory plan. 
As to the position of overrides, Mr. Robinson said: "The owner 
of such an override receives his share of the production without cost 
so long as his lessee pays, and until the unit forecloses its lien 
against the seven-eighths interest."140 
That the Supreme Court of Oklahoma agrees that the statutory 
policy with respect to the allocation of operating expense is in-
tended to be all-embracing and to supersede private contractual 
arrangements is indicated by its opinion in Palmer Oil Corp. v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co.141 In this case the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa upheld the constitutionality of the original Oklahoma Com-
pulsory Unitization law, which, as to the provisions now under 
discussion, was identical with the statute now in force. The particu-
lar point of significance to us is the court's response to a contention 
that, in limiting the royalty interest which should be free of respon-
sibility for operating expense to one-eighth, the statute cut down 
prior agreements for a greater royalty which existed in some in-
stances. The court replied: 
"Considering, as we must, that the one-eighth royalty pre-
scribed is reasonable to accomplish the overall purpose, it fol-
lows that the right to the exceptional royalty as such must yield 
to the extent it militates against the plan but should be pre-
served to the extent it may be done consistently with such plan. 
130 Id. at 220. 
HO Id. at 221. 
141 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951). 
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We hold that the Act gives full recognition to such right and 
only varies the method prescribed in the lease for its enjoy-
ment. Prior to unitization such a lessor would be entitled to 
receive the entire royalty share free from the cost of produc-
tion. The enjoyment of this right, however, was based upon the 
obligation of the lessee to produce and so deliver. Under the 
unitization such obligation obtains upon the unit to the ex-
tent of a one-eighth royalty and the obligation of the lessee to 
account for the remainder is recognized and declared. The 
liability of any excess royalty is made possible because for the 
plan of operation it is accorded the status of a leasehold inter-
est. But by reason of the lease contract treating it as royalty 
the liability is made secondary, and could only obtain where 
there was a breach of the obligation of the lessee to discharge 
the operation cost allowable thereto as part of the leasehold 
interest. "142 
Because of the special nature of leasehold royalty interests, the 
specific application of this language is not in point. Its significance 
lies in the fact that the court recognized that the statute overcomes 
a prior contractual stipulation concerning the royalty interest, 
avaries the method prescribed in the lease for its enjoyment," and 
provides that the liability of the non-operating interest in the seven-
eighths production "is made secondary." It seems clear that the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma would likewise hold that the statute 
varied the method prescribed in the Agreement now under con-
sideration for the overriding royalty's participation in liability for 
operating expense, rendering that liability secondary in character 
and to be measured by the share of unit expenses apportioned to 
each tract. To hold otherwise would stack the cards against the 
overriding interest. 
The decision in Waller v. Midstates Oil Gorp.148 offers an apt 
analogy. There, a lease provision that an overriding royalty should 
cease when wells ceased to flow oil without being pumped or pro-
duced by other artificial means was held to be superseded by a 
subsequent unitization agreement containing a provision for deal-
ing with "excess royalities" under certain circumstances. This was 
in spite of the fact that the effect of the unitization was to cause 
the entire field to be produced by "artificial means." The court 
felt that the provisions as to excess royalties must have been in-
142 Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra note 141, at 551, 231 P.2d at 
1006. 
143 218 La. 179, 48 So. 2d 648 (1950). 
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tended to supersede completely the lease provisions as to termina-
tion of the override. There is a similar incongruity here between 
the statutory provisions for operating expenses and the conditions 
of unitized operation, on the one hand, and the Agreement provi-
sion for deductions and the conditions of competitive operation on 
the other. We feel that the latter cannot stand concurrently with the 
former, and so must be completely superseded, as the statute pre-
scribes. 
It may be suggested that the per-well deduction is continued in 
force by the provisions which (I) make "primarily responsible" for 
assessments any "interest ... of other persons who by . . . contract 
or otherwise are obligated or responsible for the cost and expense 
of developing and operating a separately owned tract" and (2) re-
strict the ultimate exemption to those interests "which otherwise 
are not chargeable with such cost."144 It will be argued that the 200 
dollars per month per-well deduction makes the overriding royalty 
interest "by contract ... obligated or responsible for the cost of 
developing and operating" the tracts, pro tanto, and makes it 
"otherwise ... chargeable with such cost." This, however, is 
untenable. The key words, "obligated," "responsible," and "charge-
able," are all applied to the cost of development and operation 
under competitive conditions. These words, in legal significance, 
always have the meaning of a direct and legally enforceable duty 
with respect to the subject-in this instance the payment of the 
operating costs to those who furnished the necessary service and 
materials. 
Clearly, the Oklahoma legislature must have been cognizant of 
the legal meaning of the terms it used. It must have meant by per-
sons or interests "responsible," "obligated," and "chargeable" with 
respect to costs of development and operation, the persons or inter-
ests to whom the laborers, materialmen, and supply houses furnish-
ing the labor and the articles could look for the enforcement ·ot 
their claims. This would not include the overriding royalty inter-
est, with respect to this deduction. Had S failed to pay some part of 
the costs under competitive operation as to any one of these tracts, 
the creditor could not have secured judgment against the owner of 
the override for that amount, or for any part of his claim. He could 
not have subjected the override to his demands, even secondarily, as 
the Unit can now do. The deduction does not impose a liability 
upon the override interest for the cost of operation. S is under no 
144 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.8 (1961). 
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obligation to devote that particular sum to defraying the operating 
costs. The motive for permitting-it, as we have seen, is no doubt to 
reimburse S for part of the operating costs; but it does not impose 
on F, or his interest, a liability, a responsibility, an obligation, or a 
charge with respect to those costs, any more than an indemnity 
insurer is directly liable to those persons whom his insured may 
injure.145 This interpretation accords with the practical construc-
tion of the act by the Unit and the Unit Operator, S. If the override 
were regarded as chargeable directly with operating costs, the 
owners would be billed therefor. They are not. The assessment is 
made against S. 
The conclusion, it seems clear to us, is that the decisions below 
are erroneous. Let the judgment be that they stand condemned in 
the High Court of Juristic Review. 
A1ANLI, J.,146 concurring. There are a few points to which I 
wish to call attention, in addition to the matters discussed by the 
Chief Justice. With his expressions I am in complete accord. But 
the learned judge who sat in the district court seemed to be troubled 
by the failure of the owners of the F interests to protest the conduct 
of the defendants at an earlier date, 147 although he absolved them ex-
pressly from any imputation of laches.148 To this, I have only to say 
that the delay certainly brought about no change of position on the 
part of Sand occasioned it no harm. On the contrary, if this court is 
right in its conclusion that the provision for deductions was nulli-
fied by the change to unitized operation, all the delay entailed was 
the benefit to Sin using money which it should have paid to F. No 
estoppel or other bar can be charged against F for merely accepting 
what was due in any event.149 
The court of appeals unfortunately treated the problem posed 
by the case as requiring solution solely on principles of private con-
tract law, as is shown by the statement: "We do not deem relevant 
the argument advanced concerning the relative profits of the 
parties. The rights of parties fixed by contract are not governed 
by comparing their subsequent relative gains or losses."150 This 
145 See VANCE, INSURANCE§ 135 (3d ed. 1951). 
146 Of Choctaw derivation, substantially meaning justice. 
147 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743, 762 (N.D. 
Ill. 1960). 
148 Id. at 754. 
149 Elliott v. Pure Oil Co., 10 Ill. 2d 146, 139 N.E. 2d 295 (1957). 
150 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 281 (7th Cir. 
1961). 
1964] COMPULSORY DNITIZATION 417 
hardly will do when there is superimposed upon the private bar-
gain a plan of operation dictated by a statute so shot through, as is 
the Oklahoma Compulsory Unitization Law, with an intent to hold 
even the balance as between the several types of ownership into 
which the mineral interest in the oil country customarily is divided. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has recognized this intent, and 
has undertaken to effectuate it in other situations which have 
come before it for determination.151 It is difficult for me to conclude 
that it would not have shown a similar alertness to legislative pur-
pose in this instance. It is unfortunate that the occasion for passing 
upon the effect of the statute should have arisen before judges so 
distant from the scene alike as to geography, as to familiarity with 
the type of operations involved,152 and as to the concern of the 
Oklahoma legislators for maintaining a balance among varied 
interests.153 
In the light of the expressed legislative concern to preserve 
all interests in a fair adjustment, the assumption of the court of 
appeals, of dubious propriety at best, that the Agreement con-
templated the application of regulatory limits, even under statutes 
then unenacted, 154 becomes irrelevant. The truly relevant proposi-
tion is that the lawmakers specifically provided that the various 
interest-holders should receive "their fair, equitable, and reason-
able share of the unit production or other benefits thereof"155 and 
that "property rights, leases, contracts, and all other rights and 
obligations shall be regarded as amended and modified to the extent 
necessary to conform to the provisions and requirements of this 
Act .... "156 
It is equally irrelevant, in the light of this language, that the 
commission-approved Plan of Unitization did not make specific 
151 "The unit organization with its operator stands in a position similar to that of a 
trustee for all who are interested in the oil production either as lessees, or royalty own-
ers." Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304, 309 (Okla. 1954). It is 
obvious that the conduct of the operator in this case toward the F interests cannot be 
reconciled with that of a trustee. "In our opinion, it is more important to secure to each 
lessor, lessee, and owner of mineral rights in a field, his ratable share of the production 
therefrom . . . than it is to secure to some, the maximum profits from drilling and pro-
ducing operations." Application of Peppers Refg. Co., 272 P .2d 416, 424 (Okla. 1954). 
152 No state in the Seventh Circuit possesses a compulsory field-wide unitization law. 
lli3 Oklahoma has been from its inception an equalitarian commonwealth, and its 
laws and institutions should be interpreted in the light of this historic base. See Merrill, 
The Administrative Law of Oklahoma, 4 OKI.A. L. REv. 286, 287 (1951). This background 
reinforces the manifest intent of the Oklahoma legislature. 
154 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 279 (7th Cir. 
1961). 
ms Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 287.4(b) (1961). 
156 Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1961). 
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provision concerning the per-well deduction portions of the Agree-
ment, although the court of appeals seems to regard this as most 
significant.157 The statute strikes down any provision which does not 
preserve to the several interest holders their "fair, equitable and 
reasonable share" of the various "benefits" under unitized opera-
tion. What the unitization plan may provide or fail to provide is 
completely beside the point. This makes of decisive significance all 
those considerations of justice, fairness, and economic hardship 
which both courts below too lightly dismissed as unworthy of at-
tention.· 
157 See Peter Fox Brewing Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 296 F.2d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 
1961). 
